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public housing tenants does not so much cause white families to take
public housing as it puts the tenants in contact with white non-tenants,
thereby acting broadly to correct the evils of residential separation of the
races. The change in the basis of the court's reasoning between the
first opinion in March, 1967, and the issuance of the decree in July,
1969, may indicate a change in constitutional theories upon the part
of the court; but it does not leave the final decree without sufficient
justification. Thus Gautreaux raises for the first time the question of
whether racial imbalance in public housing is a denial of equal protection
of the laws,7" which the Constitution would require government to seek
to correct.
HUGH

J.

BEARD, JR.

Poverty Law-Garnishment-Protection of Debtors' Rights
Garnishment' is a remedy of ancient origin and doubtless has served
the interests of justice. But as wages have become the predominant
form of individual income, a once-valuable remedy has changed into an
instrument that too often shelters the unjust and defrauds the unfortunate.
In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,2 the United States Supreme
Court attempted to eliminate some of the injustices of garnishment. The
Family Finance Corporation had initiated a garnishment proceeding
against Mrs. Sniadach, and against her employer as garnishee. Defendant
was served with summons and complaint the same day that her employer
was served with process. In accordance with Wisconsin law, defendant's
employer paid her a subsistence allowance of fifty per cent of her accrued
wages and retained the other half pending disposition of the case. De" In Hicks v. Weaver, 302 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. La. 1969), a Federal district
court, upon the authority of Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, stopped
housing project construction in Bogalusa, Louisiana, on sites selected with regard
to the racial composition of either the surrounding neighborhood or of the
projects themselves.
1 Garnishment is an action that brings the defendant's property into legal
custody either to provide security for a claim that may be established in the
future or to satisfy a judgment already rendered for the plaintiff. Beggs v. Fite,
130 Tex. 46, 106 S.W.2d 1039 (1937). Attachment is a similar remedy but it
reaches property held by the defendant himself, while garnishment is appropriate
for reaching property of the defendant held by a third party. 6 Am. JuR. Attachinent and Garnishment § 3 (1963). A garnishment proceeding cannot stand alone,
but is ancillary to the principal action in which the validity of the plaintiff's claim
is determined. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-440.1 (1953).
'395 U.S. 337 (1969).
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fendant then moved in county court that the garnishment proceedings be
dismissed for failure to satisfy the due process requirement of the fourteenth amendment, in that notice and hearing were not given prior to
the freezing of her wages. The county court and subsequently the Wisconsin Supreme Court3 declared that the constitutional standard of due
process had been met. Speaking through Justice Douglas, a majority of
seven of the United States Supreme Court reversed, finding a fatal lack
4
of due process in the Wisconsin garnishment scheme.
The Court emphasized two factors in reaching its decision. The first
was the creditor's failure to show that the use of pre-judgment garnishment was required by the existence of an "extraordinary" situation,
which the Court defined as one "requiring special protection to a state
or creditor interest." 5 Although the opinion does not otherwise describe
such a situation, the examples of extraordinary circumstances cited by
the Court are cases in which the debtor's actions or status in some manner
jeopardized the creditor's access to the debtor's assets' or the court's
jurisdiction over his person.7 The fact was emphasized that Mrs.
Sniadach was a resident of the state in which the suit was instituted, and
that in personam jurisdiction was thus readily obtainable over her. 8 The
Court did not say that either the absence of personal jurisdiction or the
existence of extraordinary circumstances is a prerequisite for pre-judgment garnishment, although the absence of these factors appears to militate against its use. The case may be a step toward ultimately prohibiting
garnishment in any case where "extraordinary" circumstances are absent and where in personam jurisdiction is available.
A second factor cited by the Court is the special nature of wages as an
asset. In specifically approving9 McKay v. McInnes,"° which upheld the
prejudgment attachment of real estate and stocks without notice and prior
hearing, the Court indicated that it is not garnishment per se that is ofFamily Fin. Corp. v. Sniadach, 37 Wis. 2d 103, 154 N.W.2d 259 (1968).
'395 U.S. at 342.
1Id. at 339.

'Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950)

(seizure of

mislabeled tonic before hearing); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947) (bank
conservator appointed without prior hearing); Coffin Bros. v. Bennett, 277 U.S.
29 (1928) (bank stockholders required, without prior hearing, to contribute to

bank's solvency).

Owenby v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921)
the jurisdiction attached before hearing).

'395U.S. at 339.

(property of debtor who had fled

'Id.
at 340.
1 279 U.S. 820, aff'g neme. 127 Me. 110, 141 A. 600 (1928).
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fensive, but the taking of assets in the form of wages. The opinion seems
to suggest that the taking without notice of non-wage assets generates
fewer hardships and permits fewer abuses, and will therefore not be affected by the holding in Sniadach.
To understand the significance of Sniadach, one must appreciate the
hardships garnishment visits upon the wage-earner under present law
in most jurisdictions. The Court attempted to develop such an appreciation by devoting more than a third of the decision to a discussion
of the impact of garnishment on the defendant." The most obvious
hardship is that in all but a few states12 some income will be temporarily
withheld from the wage earner. In states such as Missouri18 and New
York,1 4 this deprivation may be a fairly minor annoyance since ninety
per cent of a worker's wages are exempt from garnishment. However,
in states such as Arizona, 5 which exempts only fifty per cent of a wage
earner's income, garnishment can precipitate a major financial crisis.
The inadequacy of most exemptions" is dramatized by statistics:
22 395 U.S. at 340-42.
12 The following laws exempt one-hundred per cent of accrued wages from garnishment: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 30-207 (1947); CAL. CIV. PROC. §§ 690.10-.11 (West
1963); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 575.05 (1945); MONT. REv. CODE ANx. § 93-5816
(1947); NEV. REV. STAT. §21.090(h) (1967); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-362 (1953);
PA. STAT. tit. 42 § 886 (1966); S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1731 (1962); S.D. ComP.
LAWS § 15-20-12 (1967); TEX. CONST. art. 16, § 28.
1 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 525.030 (1952).
14
N.Y. Civ. PRAC. § 5205(e) (2) (1963).
12
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1594A (1956).
ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 630 (1958) (seventy-five per cent of wages exempted);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1594A (1956) (fifty per cent exempted when needed
for support of debtor's family); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 77-2-4 (1963) (seventy
per cent exempted for heads of families, and thirty-five per cent for single persons) ;
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-361 (b) (1958) (sixty-five dollars per week exempt) ;
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4913 (1953) (sixty per cent of wages exempt in Kent and
Sussex County, but ninety per cent except in New Castle County when used for
articles found in the home); GA. CODE ANN. §46-208 (1965) (three dollars per
day exempt plus fifty per cent of the excess over three dollars) ; IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 11-205 (1947) (seventy-five per cent exempted if earnings are necessary for
use of debtor's family residing in Idaho, but only fifty per cent exemption if debt
is incurred for necessaries actually furnished); IOwA CODE ANN. § 627.10 (1950)
(thirty-five dollars plus three dollars for each dependent under eighteen); Ky.
REv. STAT. § 427-010 (1964) (seventy-five per cent exempted except when debt
incurred for necessities, in which case exemption is only fifty per cent); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 2602(6) (1964) (thirty dollars exempt); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 9, §§ 31(a), (b) (1957) (one-hundred dollars exempted except in Cecil,
Caroline, Kent, Queen Anne's and Worchester Counties where seventy-five per
cent is exempted); MASS. ANN. LAwS ch. 246, § 28 (2 Pov. L. REP. 9906 (June
16, 1969) ) (eighty dollars per week) ; MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.7511 (2) (1962) (in
most cases, sixty per cent exempted for a householder, and forty per cent for a single
person); Miss. CODE ANN. § 307(10) (1942) (seventy-five per cent exemption);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 512:211 (1955) (no exemption for wages earned but not
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In this country, eighty-five per cent of all personal income is used for
current consumption;'1 at lower income levels the percentage is higher.1"

Therefore, in states exempting eighty-five per cent or less,1" the average
individual is forced to reduce his accustomed level of consumption fol-

lowing garnishment; and the impact is proportionally greater on individuals with less income. Moreover, many states' garnishment schemes
that feature generous exemptions do not provide in practice the relief
that they offer in theory. Many states require of the defendant some
affirmative action-most commonly filing an affidavit with the clerk of
court-to claim the statutory exemption. 20 Because of ignorance of the
exemption, or because of unwillingness to expend the necessary time and
paid before service of process); ch. 92, [1969] N.J. Acts (2 Pov. L. REP. 9969
(June 30, 1969)) (forty-eight dollars per week or ten per cent exempted if salary
does not exceel 2,500 dollars per year) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 26-2-27 (1953) (eighty
per cent of first seventy-five dollars exempt, but one-hundred per cent of wages
above seventy-five dollars per month may be garnished) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-0902 (1960) (thirty-five dollars per week exempt for resident who is not head of family; for head of family fifty dollars plus five dollars for each dependent exempt);
ORE. REV. STAT. § 23.181 (1965) (fifty per cent exempt but in no case less than
twenty-five dollars); R.I. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-244 (1956) (in most cases, a
straight fifty-dollar exemption); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 26-207 to -208 (1968)
(fifty per cent for head of family but in no case less than twenty dollars nor more
than either of fifty dollars, or seventeen dollars and fifty cents per week plus two
dollars and fifty cents per dependent); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-23-1(7) (1953)
(fifty per cent but only for head of family who needs earnings to support dependents); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 3020(5) (1959) (thirty dollars per week plus
fifty per cent of all wages in excess of sixty dollars per week exempted); VA.
CODE ANN. § 34-29 (1950) (exact exemption computed on maximum-minimum
table, but the thirty-five dollars weekly minimum and one-hundred fifty dollars
monthly maximum indicate the general inadequacy of the provision); ch. 264, § 28,
[1969] Wash. Laws (2 Pov. L. REP. 9899 (June 16, 1969)) (seventy-five per
cent exempted); ch. 127, [1969] Wis. Laws (2 Pov. L. REP. 10,218 (Aug. 8,
1969)) (seventy-five per cent exempted); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-422 (1957) (fifty
per cent exempted).

" U.S.

STATISTIcS
8Id.

BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICs, DEP'T OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR

281 (1968).

19
In addition to the states cited in note 16 supra, the following states also
exempt eighty-five per cent or less of an employee's wages: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 62,
§ 73 (Smith-Hurd 1964) (forty-five dollars per week or eighty-five per cent of
gross wages, whichever is greater, exempted); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:3881
(1968)) (eighty per cent of wages exempted, but in no case will the exemption be
less than one-hundred dollars per month); OnIo REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 2329.66(F),
2333.21 (Page 1954) (eighty-two and one-half per cent of monthly wages exempt,
but only sixty per cent of biweekly wages, and thirty per cent of weekly wages
exempt).
2
See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 8-527, 11-203 (1947); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 627.10 (1962); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2310 (1964) ; Nnv. REv. STAT. § 21.090(h)

(1967).
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effort, the exemption is rarely claimed in states where the appropriate
21
portion of the wage-earner's pay is not automatically exempted.
Garnishment may also cost the defendant his job; the firing of workers2
whose wages are garnished is a widespread, if not universal, practice.1
Employers are required to answer the garnishment complaint, keep separate accounts for the employee's exempt and non-exempt wages, and
in some states even appear in court. 23 The expense involved can be tremendously burdensome. 24 Because prospective employers feel that garnishment of a debtor's wages reflects poorly on his integrity and ability,
and because employers seek to avoid future garnishment expense and
trouble, they rarely hire individuals whose wages have been garnished
in the past.25 The total economic impact of prejudgment garnishment
is described accurately in Sniadach: "The result is that a prejudgment
garnishment of the Wisconsin type may as a practical matter drive a wage
earning family to the wall." 6
No one would argue that the law should not provide for the collection
of just debts. Viewed in this light, the debtor has brought garnishmentgenerated hardships on himself. But too often, the defendant is the
victim not of reluctance to pay his debts, but of sharp or illegal practices
sheltered and encouraged by the garnishment process. Such practices are
nurtured by the economic pressure exerted on the garnishment defendant,
which makes it impossible for him to await a hearing of his case on the
merits, particularly where there are crowded court dockets. Empirical
research shows that few suits preceded by an ancillary action in garnishment are ever heard on their merits and that the typical outcome in such
cases is a default judgment for the plaintiff.2 7 Perhaps the defendants
21

Brunn, Wage Garnishment in California: A Study and Recommendations,

CALIF. L. REV. 1214, 1219 (1965).
'2 D. CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MoRE 157 (1967); S. MARGOLIS, THE INNOCENT CONSUMERS VS THE EXPLOITERS 100 (1967); Wage Garnishment in Washington-An Empirical Study, 43 WASH. L. REV. 735, 756 (1968); Note, Wage

53

as a Collection Device, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 759, 761.
Garnishment
22 Wage Garnishment in Washington, supra note 22, at 755.
" Hearings on H.R. 11601 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the
House Conmm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., at 197 [hereinafter
cited as Hearings]. In 1966, Inland Steel spent $500,000 to cover costs of garnishments of its employees' wages. Id.
22 Wage Garnishment in Washington, supra note 22, at 790.
26395 U.S. at 341. The language of Sniadach emphasizes the effect of garnishment on the family, but it is the individual not supporting a family who receives
the smaller benefit from state exemption statutes. See notes 16 & 19 supra.

1A 1967 survey in one Washington jurisdiction showed that of 227 cases

involving prejudgment garnishment reported over a six-month period, not one case

went to trial. Out of an undisclosed number of similar cases over a period of a
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in these studies could not have presented valid defenses, but it is probable
in many cases that garnishment prevented their assertion. Many creditors,
aware that garnishment can be invoked to prevent a disgruntled debtor
from airing his grievances in court, enrich themselves at little risk by
engaging in patently fraudulent practices.2"
Two escape routes exist under current law for a debtor to avoid the
rigors of garnishment. First, he can make new arrangements with his
creditor for the liquidation of the debt. This option is the one most often
chosen by debtors, and desired by creditors. By making such arrangements, the debtor not only waives his best opportunity to assert defenses,
but he may also be required by the creditor to defray all costs of asserting
the legal process of garnishment, including attorney's fees, filing fees and
court costs, 29 and be forced as well to pay all of the creditor's personal

expenses in the matter."0 Alternatively, the debtor may declare bankruptcy. The incidence of personal bankruptcy has been increasing at a
phenomenal rate when one considers that the past several years have
been periods of economic prosperity."' Even bankruptcy may not provide
the debtor the relief he seeks; a surprising number of bankrupts reaffirm
debts that had been released in bankruptcy. 2
The methods used by states to comply with the Sniadach decision
will determine its effectiveness. Clearly, they must set up machinery to
provide the garnishment defendant a hearing prior to the time that his
wages are suspended. The sort of notice received by the defendant is
critical because the right to be heard will not be exercised unless it is
known to exist. If the debtor is notified only of the main action on the
debt, and if his notice and summons contain no mention of a hearing on
the propriety of prejudgment garnishment, he will be forced to rely on
the same informal sources that have been unsuccessful in informing him
year, only one went to trial. Patterson, Wage Garnishment-An Extraordinary
Remedy Run Anuck, foreword to Wage Garnishnent in Washington-An Enpirical Study, 43 WASH. L. tEv. 735, 735-36 (1968). For other studies with
similar results, see id. 764; Hearings 435.
8Hearings 500.
" W.

MAGNUSON

& J. CARPER, THE DARK SIDE OF THE MARKETPLACE

94

(1968); S. MARGOLIS, supra note 22, at 102.
" W. MAGNUSON & J. CARPER, supra note 29, at 94; S. MARGOLIS, supra note
22, at 102.
1, ADmINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, TABLES OF BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS 3-5 (1967). The total number of bankruptcies in 1966 was 208,392, an
increase of 8.3 per cent from the previous year. Personal bankruptcies accounted
for ninety-two per cent of the total. See also Hearings 413-50.
"2Brendes & Schwartz, Schlockineister's Jubilee: Bankruptcy for the Poor,40
REF. J. 69 (1966).
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of the availability of exemptions. The promise of a day in court to the
garnishment defendant will le realized only if he is informed both of the
availability of a hearing and of the mechanics required to secure it.
Assuming the debtor seeks and secures a hearing prior to garnishment, what matters are in issue? Would the hearing be proper for consideration of the action "on its merits," i.e., could the debtor raise his
defenses to the underlying transaction? Or would consideration of only
demurrable errors or the garnishment equivalent of probable cause be allowed? There is language in Sniadach indicating that the hearing
would be on the merits:
But in the interim the wage earner is deprived of his enjoyment
of earned wages without an opportunity to be heard and to tender
88
any defense he may have, whether it be fraud or otherwise.
If states choose to set up hearings on the full merits of the underlying
claim, two possible consequences are apparent. First, if the pre-garnishment hearing on the merits were res judicata in the subsequent principle
action on the debt, there would be no need for a second trial-a pregarnishment hearing administered in this fashion would mean the end of
pre-judgment garnishment. Legal writers have long argued that such a
change would eliminate the worst abuses of the procedure.8 4 Second, faced
with a reasonable certainty of having to show a meritorious case before
being able to invoke the coercive machinery of garnishment, creditors
would be discouraged from engaging in fraudulent practices.
The debtor with a valid defense will face a dilemma if the hearing on
garnishment is not made binding at the later trial of the underlying
claim. If he presents his defenses at the pre-garnishment hearing in
order to save his job and his income, he "educates" his opponent and
gives him a second chance at a later determinative trial. Few garnishment defendants would want to save money temporarily by defending
vigorously and winning at the pre-garnishment hearing, only later to lose
to a better-prepared creditor at full trial. However, the debtor's only
alternative to defending at a prior hearing is to await trial, which can
lead to economic disaster if he has a low income. If the Sniadach decision is implemented by a hearing that a non-determinative on the merits,
the protection intended by the court will be significantly vitiated.
A third possibility would be to limit the issue at the hearing to the
395 U.S. at 339.
" Wage Garnishinentin California,supra note 21, at 1248; Wage Garnishment
in Washington, supra note 22, at 785.
33
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existence of the garnishment equivalent of probable cause: The creditor
would be required to show that there is probable cause for the court to
believe that the defendant is in default on a legitimate debt. A hearing of
this sort would prevent the wage earner's income from being garnished
to pay a patently fraudulent debt, but it would not completely do away
with pre-judgment garnishment. The defendant could choose to defend
with vigor and educate the creditor on his defenses or remain silent and
await trial on the merits. Here, of course, the creditor would also be
required to disclose some of his case against the defendant.
Finally, the hearing could be one at which only demurrable errors
could be raised. Evasion of such a hearing would be simple: the creditor
willing to run the risk of being found out later could file a complaint that
was false but that appeared regular on its face. This type judicial procedure would afford the debtor little protection.35
The Supreme Court in Sniadach intended to protect the garnishment
defendant; but, administered improperly, the decision could generate
abuses by the debtor. Sniadach clearly indicates that a hearing must precede garnishment. This requirement gives a defendant with notice of the
garnishment an opportunity to go to his employer before the hearing and
collect his accrued wages; only subsequent wages would then be left for the
creditor. If the employer were required to freeze the defendant's wages at
the time he is notified of the action, then the defendant's wages would be
in fact garnished prior to hearing, probably in violation of Sniadach.
A reasonable compromise between the interests of debtor and creditor
would be for state law to prohibit the employer, once notified of the
garnishment, from paying the defendant his accrued wages. However,
the hearing would be required to be held within an appropriately short
time-a week or less-after service of process on the employer, with a
provision that the defendant's regular pay day not fall in the period between service and hearing. This procedure would not technically satisfy
Sniadach's prohibition of freezing of wages before a hearing, but, properly applied, it would avoid all the abuses by creditors mentioned by the
Court, as well as protect their interests.
Prior to the decision of Sniadach, several legislative solutions to the
problems of garnishment had been enacted. 36 The most important of these
is the Consumer Credit Protection Act (CCPA), which becomes effective
"See, e.g., Wis. STAT. AxN. § 263.24 (1957). It is under FED. R. Civ. P. 11
and its state counterparts that the potential for this abuse is most apparent.
" 2 Pov. L. RziP. 9970 (June 30, 1969) (New York); 2 Pov. L. REP. 9899
June 16, 1969) (Washington).
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1970.s"

on July 1,
The Act prohibits the firing of an employee "by reason
of the fact that his earnings have been subjected to garnishment for any
one indebtedness."8 8 This language will benefit few employees because employers rarely discharge for the first garnishment.80 The Act prohibits
firing for "garnishment for any one indebtedness," rather than for any
one garnishment, so that an employee who is garnished several times for
a single obligation is protected. The statute's psychological impact may
ultimately prove more important than its substantive provisions. Since
Congress has indicated that firing for one garnishment is objectionable
and is therefore prohibited, the way may be paved for state legislation
preventing firing for any number of garnishments. The measure could
also have the opposite effect of providing employers who do not discharge
for garnishment, or who discharge only for multiple levies, an excuse
for firing an employee after the second garnishment of his wages for
separate debts. The fact that, subsequent to the passage of the CCPA,
two states further restricted the discharging of employees for garnishmen ° indicates that the CCPA will probably have the former effect.
The CCPA also exempts seventy-five per cent of an employee's wages
from garnishment.4" This increases the exemption in only twenty-three
states and is inadequate to protect most defendants awaiting trial. The
exemption however, is automatic,42 requiring no affirmative action on the
part of the defendant to claim it.
The solutions offered by the Court and by Congress to the problems
of garnishment differ greatly in approach and application. The protection
afforded the garnishment defendant by the CCPA will be of great assistance, regardless of the validity of the underlying debt, while the hearing
guaranteed by the Sniadach decision will be of small use to the wageearner whose income is suspended because of a just debt. The CCPA
enables the debtor to await trial by preserving his employment and
" 82 Stat. 162 (1968). This measure was enacted in May, 1968, but its effec-

tive date was delayed to give the states an opportunity to avoid federal regulation

by enacting similar legislation. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Opinion of Wage-Hour Ad-

ministrator, No. 956 (March 12, 1969), reported in 2 Pov. L. R P. 9593 (April 7,
1969).
9682 Stat. 163 (1968).
Wage Garnishment in Washington, supra note 22, at 757.

°2 Pov. L. RaP. 9970 (June 30, 1969). New York now flatly prohibits firing
for any number of garnishments. 2 Pov. L. Rar,. 9899 (June 16, 1969). Washington permits firing only after garnishments for three or more separate indebtednesses within a year.
4182 Stat. 163 (1968).
42
Id.
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most of his income, while Sniadach goes directly to the heart of the problem by requiring that a hearing precede garnishment. The degree of
protection Sniadachl will ultimately provide depends upon the administrative techniques the states choose to implement it, while the CCPA's
mandate cannot be avoided.
CLINTON EUDY, JR.

Real Property-Direct Restraints on Alienation
Owners who dispose of property frequently attempt to attach restrictions on its further sale or disposition. In Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v.
John Thomasson Construction Co.,' a case recently before the North
Carolina Supreme Court, property had been conveyed in trust for the
use of Alexander Children's Home, a non-profit charitable corporation,
with the provision that the trustees should have no power to sell or convey it. The court upheld this restriction against sale by saying in part
that it would be a strange deviation to permit creation of perpetual
charitable trusts while preventing the donor from restraining the sale
of the trust corpus. Since direct restraints on alienation are normally
void, and this decision reversed the court of appeals and overturned
strong dicta which had earlier been generally accepted as indicating such
restraints would be void in North Carolina,2 the decision suggests a review of the case law concerning direct restraints on alienation. 3
Direct restraints, as discussed in this note, are terms incorporated
in the devise or grant that would preclude or limit alienation or set up
penalties for attempts to alienate. If the restraint is phrased so that the
power to alienate is withheld or limited, as was the case in Thomasson,
it is termed a disabling restraint. If the restraint calls for forfeiture of
the interest to a third party or for reversion back to the grantor when the
prohibition is violated, it is, quite naturally, termed a forfeiture restraint.4 As will be seen, forfeiture restraints are sometimes valid where
a similar disabling restraint is void.
-275 N.C. 399, 168 S.E.2d 358 (1969).

'Hass v. Hass, 195 N.C. 734, 741, 143 S.E. 541, 544 (1928).
'See generally 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY pt. 26 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952)
[hereinafter cited as A.L.P.]; J. GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY (2d ed. 1895) [hereinafter cited as GRAY]; 6 R. POWELL, THE LAw OF REAL
PROPERTY §§ 839-48 (recomp. 1969) [hereinafter cited as POWELL] ; IV RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 404-38 (1944) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT]; L.
SIMES & A. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS §§ 1111-71 (2d ed. 1956)
[hereinafter cited as SIMES & SMITH].
'6 A.L.P. § 26.1.

